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Deeds--Reversions-Conveyance to Heirs General of Grantor.
Grantor conveyed land to her daughter and the daughter's husband,
for their joint lives, then to the survivor, remainder after the determina-
tion of the life estate to the daughter's children, begotten by her said
husband, in fee simple; and in the event she had no children by the said
husband, then an estate in fee simple forever, to the right heirs of the
grantor. Subsequently the grantor, the daughter and her husband
conveyed the land in fee simple to the defendant's grantor. The original
grantor died first; then the husband. Finally, the grantor's daughter
died leaving no children. Plaintiffs, collateral heirs of the grantor, sued
for the land. Held, judgment for defendants. A reversion was created
in the grantor upon the happening of the contingency, and her heirs
take by descent rather than by purchase; therefore, they take nothing,
their ancestor having previously granted the reversion.1
According to the English common law if an owner of land in fee
simple sought to convey a life estate or an estate in tail, with a remainder
to the grantor's heirs, the remainder was void and the grantor had a re-
version in fee simple2 which would go to his heirs, if at all, by descent
and not by purchase. The reason for the rule was that to allow the
heirs to take as purchasers would have deprived the grantor's overlord
of the feudal rights of wardship and marriage in the case of 'a minor
heir.3 This rule was a positive rule of law like the rule in Shelley's
Case, and was applied in every case where the limitation was to the
heirs general of the grantor.4 England in 1833, by statute, abolished the
rule and since that time a grantor's or devisor's heirs take as purchasers. 5
The rule is strictly applied in some American jurisdictions as a positive
rule of law,6 in others it has been entirely ignored,7 while some states
have applied the rule as one of construction, having given consideration
to the intent of the grantor as gathered from the whole instrument.
8
North Carolina has recognized the principle that where the grantor
1 Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936).
'Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Reprint 432 (1740); 1 Simes,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §144; Comment (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 116.
'1 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §145.
'1 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §147.
83 & 4 WiLL. IV, C. 106, §3 (1833).
'West Tenn. Co. v. Townes, 52 F. (2d) 764 (D. C. Miss. 1931); Hobbie v.
Ogden, 178 Ill. 357, 53 N. E. 104 (1899) ; Nickols v. Davis, 188 Ky. 215, 221 S. W.
507 (1920) ; Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 S. 39 (1922) ; Robinson v. Blank-
enship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S. W. 854 (1906).
'Hall v. Realty and Investment Co., 306 Mo. 182, 267 S. W. 407 (1924) ; New
Jersey Title Co. v. Parker, 84 N. 3. Eq. 351, 93 Ati. 196 (1915), aff'd, 85 N. J. Eq.
557, 96 Atl. 574 (1915) ; (1934) 20 CORN L. Q. 116, 117 n. 10.
'Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), Comment (1919) 4
CORN. L. Q. 83; Comment (1920) 28 YALE L. J. 713; Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929) ; Comment (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV.
837; 1 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §147.
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in a conveyance attempts, after creating a particular estate in favor of
another, to limit by the same instrument a fee simple estate in favor of
his heirs general who would properly take such an estate by descent
from him, the limitation is invalid, and the grantor is regarded as hav-
ing the reversion in fee simple. 9 The mere fact that the estate is called
a remainder does not preclude the holding that it is in effect a rever-
sion.10 It is said that at common law such a remainder could not divest
the grantor of the fee, under the rule that nemo est haeres viventis-no
one is the heir of a living person."' However, the decisions, considered
as a whole, are in confusion as to whether North Carolina has the rule
and if so whether it is an inexorable rule of property. Some cases have
construed a limitation to the heirs of the testator as a remainder ;12
others have said it was a reversion ;13 and still others, without consid-
ering the application of the rule under discussion, have digressed on the
question as to whether the heirs of the testator should be determined
as a group on the death of the life tenant, or in the orthodox manner,
at the death of the settlor.' 4 The operation of the common law rule
may be affected by C. S. §1739 which provides that limitations by
deed, will or other writing, to the heirs of a living person, shall be con-
strued to be the children of such person unless a contrary intention ap-
pears by the deed or will. 1' The present writer has found but one case
in which the statute was applied.16 There a limitation to the heirs of
the grantor was was construed to mean children, since it was clear from
an examination of the entire deed that the grantor did not contemplate
surviving his wife or that there was a possibility of reverter in him. The
'King v. Scoggins, 92 N. C. 99 (1885) ; Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84
S. E. 347 (1915)."°King v. Scoggins, 92 N. C. 99 (1885) (principle recognized that although
the limitation is called a remainder, it may be in effect a reversion).
'See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 334, 84 S. E. 347, 347 (1915).
2 Grantham v. Jinnette, 177 N. C. 229, 98 S. E. 724 (1919). The property was
devised to the wife, at whose death the executor was to sell the property left by
her and divide the proceeds among testator's legal heirs. There were no heirs to
take under the will when wife died. Held, the widow is not the husband's heir at
common law, and property will not descend to her heirs under the statute mak-
ing her the heir of the husband if he has not devised the property. A contingent re-
mainder was created here. Allen, J., dissenting, makes the point that the devise to le-
gal heirs was void as a remainder; this left the reversion in fee in the testator at his
death and it would pass to widow as his heir under the statute. Baugham v. Trust
Co., 181 N. C. 406, 409, 107, S. E. 431, 432 (1921) "It is true that the limitation to
the heirs of the testator is referred to in some of the cases as a remainder to the
heirs, and in others as a reversion left in the testator."
'See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 335, 84 S. E. 347, 348 (1915) (prin-
ciple recognized).
"Jenkins v. Lambeth, 172 N. C. 466, 90 S. E. 513 (1916).
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1739.
"Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915) (conveyance in con-
templation of marriage to M, the intended wife, to descend to the heirs of the
body of the said M in fee simple, the issue of such marriage, and on failure of
issue to revert to the heirs of the grantor).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
effect, however, of the court's decision was to bring the case within the
doctrine, that, if by "heirs" the grantor meant "children" or those who
would be his heirs if he died at the death of the life tenant, or if in
any other way he indicated a class of remaindermen, which might dif-
fer from his heirs general, the rule would have no application.
17
The principal case lays down the common law rule that when the
limitation is to the heirs general of the grantor, such heirs take by de-
scent since the grantor retained the reversion. Here the statute' 8 was
not regarded as applicable because the court apparently thought the
intention of the grantor was otherwise as to the use of the word "heirs,"' 19
and the rule under discussion was applied as a rule of property. It is
submitted that the court, in so deciding, failed to consider the grantor's
intention derived from the instrument as a whole. The conveyance
was to the grantor's only child and to the child's husband, and to the
survivor of them, then to their children, and if there were none, then
to the grantor's own right heirs. It would thus seem that she had given
up all interest in the land and her collateral heirs would be entitled
to take. Instead of availing itself of the opportunity to change the
rule to one of construction, the court preferred to follow its precedents
laid down in the wills cases, where similar limitations were under con-
sideration, and in which the rule was applied as one of property.
20
The North Carolina court in other decisions has inaugurated the com-
mendable policy of disregarding the rigid technicalities of the common
law2l and has sought to give effect to the grantor's intention.22 Since
the ancient reasons for the rule no longer exist, the rule itself should be
abolished; but if the court is going to apply it, then it should be applied
as as a rule of construction so as not to defeat the intention of the
grantor. This would be in keeping with the trend of modern au-
thority.
23
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
"71 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §147.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1739.
" One could hardly interpret "heirs" as meaning children here, since the daugh-
ter was an only child.
IYelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N. C. 614, 135 S. E. 632 (1926); Note (1935)
14 N. C. L. REv. 90 (Doctrine of Worthier Title).
"Willis and Regan v. Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 183 N. C. 267, 269, 111
S. E. 163, 164 (1922) "The rigid technicalities of the common law have grad-
ually yielded to the demand for a more rational mode of expounding deeds." Pugh
v. Allen, 179 N. C. 307, 309, 102 S. E. 394 (1920) "It is the recognized position in
this state that except when modified by some arbitrary principle of law like the
Rule in Shelly's Case, this perhaps is the only exception now prevailing, a deed
must be construed so as to effect the intention of the parties as expressed in the
entire instrument."
Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N. C. 398, 135 S. E. 121 (1926).
" 1 Simes, FUTURE INTERMSs (1936)'§147.
